Ukraine, Pierrakakis and the Council’s Veto

The first, inevitably, concerned Trump’s 28-point proposal, which in its initial form looked less like a ceasefire plan and more like a Ukrainian capitulation. In truth, it also resembled a European capitulation - without Europe even being in the room. Since negotiations are still ongoing, any definitive interpretation right now would be premature.

Once upon a time in the Eurogroup
The second issue relates to the prospect of a Greek minister being elected president of the Eurogroup. I understand that the effort is real and currently underway. However, given that expectations - often high - are disproportionate to the country’s size and, more importantly, its record during the previous decade, I’ll state my view as clearly as possible.
Greece is seeking one of Europe’s top positions, in the very Council that, a decade ago, Yanis Varoufakis was secretly recording. That’s the institution we’re talking about. So, if - against early forecasts - the Greek Minister of National Economy and Finance, Kyriakos Pierrakakis, manages to secure the majority support of his 19 counterparts, it would constitute a major national achievement.
For those of us who witnessed the previous decade more closely than the average observer, the emotions such a possibility evokes are intense and complex. Not so long ago - and unfortunately for understandable reasons - it was sometimes difficult for a Greek representative to even speak in that room. And now we are discussing the possibility of a Greek presidency. No exaggeration.

On the question of vetoes
Finally, last Friday I had the privilege of moderating a panel of the Union of European Federalists (UEF), who held their congress in Athens - and doing so from the president’s chair of the Hellenic Senate, where the opening event took place. One of their core proposals is a Unified Europe, based on the direct vote of European citizens and the abolition of the veto held by member states.
To begin with, at a time when the very existence of Europe is tested on multiple fronts, promoting the idea of the “United States of Europe” - essentially, deeper political union - deserves a prominent and dynamic place in the public debate. Not as an idealistic wish for harmony among peoples and global peace without defence spending. Such utopias are usually invoked - disingenuously - by supporters of Vladimir Putin.
What we do need on this continent is a serious conversation about deeper integration as a realistic and ultimately necessary solution.
At this stage, however, any discussion about abolishing, or even partially limiting, the veto in the Council cannot realistically move forward at 27. What we may see is a willingness by a group of member states to move ahead - a kind of “coalition of the willing”. The recent decisions taken by the “26” without Hungary point precisely in that direction.
Political union may be the end goal, but before we get there, we need full agreement on the framework of a common foreign and defence policy. Only then can the debate on removing national vetoes truly begin. For now, we are nowhere near that point.
Thus, the EU typically reaches difficult decisions only when confronted with serious crises.
One final point: it is awkward - even illogical - for someone to demand the abolition of member-state vetoes in the Council, while simultaneously defending the use of political-group vetoes in the democratically elected European Parliament during the negotiations for the next EU budget.
For the time being, we must simply learn to live with - and, where possible, work effectively despite - the fact that veto rights exist in both cases by agreed rules. And that their use is always a possibility.